New harassment case against Leroy Truth: Raises Serious First Amendment Questions, Again

A new harassment complaint filed against independent journalist, Leonard Filipowski, known online as Leroy Truth, is now moving through Secaucus Municipal Court after being transferred from Union City. The charge is harassment under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a) — a statute that covers certain communications made with the purpose to harass.

But based on the complaint paperwork, incident report, and supporting materials reviewed here, the case appears to be built almost entirely on public criticism of a police sergeant and other public officials, raising major legal questions about whether the complaint crosses into unconstitutional territory — and whether the approving judicial officer, the prosecutor, and the complaining officer properly applied the law.

What the complaint claims — and why it matters

According to the documents, Union City Police Sgt. Jasen Bellamy signed a complaint alleging that Filipowski used social media and video commentary to attack his credibility, accuse him of misconduct, and call him “vile” or “derelict.” The narrative frames the posts as “defamation” and claims they were meant to cause emotional harm.

The complaint also references an earlier public incident where the sergeant was working in uniform and in his official capacity while Leroy Truth recorded, commented on events and posted written commentary on social media.

That detail is crucial: when speech targets a public official’s conduct at a public event, courts treat that as core political speech — the kind of expression that receives the strongest First Amendment protection.

The legal problem: New Jersey harassment law cannot be used to punish political criticism

New Jersey’s Supreme Court has repeatedly limited how harassment charges can be used when the alleged conduct is speech.

In State v. Hoffman, the Court explained that harassment cannot be based on mere annoyance or offense; the statute must be read narrowly to avoid punishing protected speech.

In State v. Burkert, the Court warned that harassment laws cannot be stretched to criminalize crude or insulting expression, especially when the speech is public commentary.

Put simply: calling a public official “vile,” accusing them of wrongdoing, or criticizing their job performance may be harsh — but it is usually protected speech, not criminal harassment.

The statute requires proof that the speaker’s purpose was to harass, not simply to criticize or speak out. Courts have said that political speech, even when aggressive or uncomfortable, generally does not meet that standard.

A pattern of complaints — and why it should have mattered here

This new case does not stand alone. Public reporting has described earlier “citizen complaints” against Leroy filed by Union City officials, including Mayor Brian Stack and Police Chief Anthony Facchini, over similar conflicts tied to political speech and recordings.

Media coverage has also documented a prior arrest at a Union City commissioners meeting over alleged “disrespect,” which later became the subject of litigation and broader First Amendment debate.

All charges have then been dismissed on First Amendment grounds.

That history is important because prosecutors and judges are supposed to consider context. When similar speech-based cases repeatedly arise — and courts have warned about constitutional limits — approving another nearly identical harassment charge without careful scrutiny invites criticism that the system is being used to pressure or silence a critic.

Why the sergeant’s complaint draws legal criticism

The complaint paperwork emphasizes reputational harm and alleged “slander.” But defamation disputes are normally handled through civil courts, not criminal harassment statutes.

Filing a criminal complaint over speech criticizing an officer’s conduct while on duty raises several concerns:

The speech appears to involve public commentary about official actions, not private targeted harassment. The officer, as seen by Leroy’s video on Facebook and YouTube, was acting in uniform at a public event, making him a public figure in that context, which increases First Amendment protections. The documents suggest official police contact information and departmental channels were used, creating the appearance that government resources are being used to pursue a personal grievance.

Even if legally allowed, using the weight of criminal process against political criticism can look less like law enforcement and more like retaliation — a perception that undermines public trust.

The prosecutor’s role — and why approving the case is controversial

New Jersey court rules require a probable cause review before a summons is issued on a private citizen complaint. That means a prosecutor or reviewing authority must determine whether the facts actually fit the law.

In a speech-based harassment case, that review should ask:

Is this speech directed at invading someone’s privacy, or is it general public commentary?

Is there any evidence of threats or intimidation — or just insults?

Does the complaint describe criminal conduct, or simply criticism that offended someone?

If the complaint is based mainly on online criticism of a public official, approving it risks contradicting New Jersey Supreme Court guidance that harassment statutes must be narrowly applied to avoid chilling free speech.

Critics argue that allowing a case like this to move forward suggests a failure to apply that constitutional filter at the prosecutorial level.

The approving judge — and the probable cause question

Equally controversial is the role of the judicial officer who approved the complaint. Judge Karen Boylan.

A judge is not supposed to rubber-stamp a harassment charge simply because someone claims to feel offended. Under court rules, the judge must independently decide whether the facts show probable cause for a criminal offense.

When the underlying conduct is political speech, that review carries even more weight. Courts are expected to apply constitutional limits before allowing criminal process to begin.

Approving a harassment summons based primarily on speech criticizing a police officer’s performance raises legitimate questions about whether the probable-cause standard was applied carefully — or whether the judge accepted a broad interpretation of the statute that higher courts have repeatedly rejected.

It would also question her judgement with other cases while on the bench.

The Secaucus Prosecutor’s, Michael B. Bookman , judgment and authority of prosecutorial discretion also comes into a serious question here. What really seems to be even more concerning is what exactly is being taught to these attorneys in law school when complaints like this is simple constitutional law of 101.

Why this case looks legally weak

Taken together, the facts described in the complaint suggest a dispute over public commentary rather than criminal harassment:

The speech appears tied to a public event and a public official’s duties. The alleged harm is reputational or emotional, not physical or threatening. The complaint uses language associated with civil defamation rather than criminal conduct.

Under New Jersey precedent, those factors make a harassment prosecution difficult to sustain.

The bigger picture

The controversy surrounding this new case is not just about one summons. It reflects a larger tension playing out in New Jersey and across the country: how far government officials can go in using harassment laws against outspoken critics.

When police officers, prosecutors, and judges approve criminal charges tied to political speech, they must walk a narrow constitutional line. If that line is crossed, the result is not just a weak case — it risks turning the criminal justice system into a tool that discourages public debate.

Whether this complaint survives in court remains to be seen. But the legal questions it raises — about free speech, probable cause, and the responsibilities of judges and prosecutors — are already impossible to ignore.

See bellow of all relevant complaints and pictures: